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...

Everyme bows that nuclear energy has brought a revolution
in the life of man. It is a dual cldlmge, a threat and a promise.
The threat is of utter destrucbIm by the nuclear weapons of
war. The promise is of an abundant life for all of manldnd based
on nuclear p e r and nuclear aids to medicine and 0 t h
sciences. The promise will b fulfilled only If we live long
emu@, somebow evading the k
t of destruction.
It would be more pIaasant to dwell on the promising side,
to hope &at by emphasis m %tams for p e ~ we
~ 8a d~ d some
how push the h t into the background. That approach is a
little like. sweeping the dirt: under the rug. It is the purpose of
this pamphlet to look insteadat the moreserious aspect of the
atomic age, at the tbxeat and to see whether them is something
we can do to a m e h t e it.

threat of nucicor weapons

The big bombs of past wars destroyed mainly by blast, the a d den pressure wave In the air capable of pushing over brick walls
and twisting the landscape. There were special bombs for sbrap
nel, and special fairly small *incendiary bombs" used in great
numbers for starting fires, but most of the big-bomb damage
was done by blast
A nuclear weapon, tm,inflicts mu& of iEs damage by blast,
but the same weapon also jn%icts peat damage in its vicinity
by an immediate flash of intease radiation. In addition to this it
sends up a great cloud of radioactive material which trickles
down to earth many miles away and contaminates
areag
with delayed and biologically harmful radiation, or fallout

what war means
Blast and the immediate radiation from the bomb are its punch
as a weapon of war, by which it can destroy whole cities or
knock out even hardened missile bases if it hits close enough
These efEects can be isolated in pea-time testing of nuclear
weapons to sea or desert where they will do no serious ham.
But only the nearby and most intense part of the fdout can
be isolated in this way. Some of the fallout comes d m thousands of mil= from the site of the test, some of it years later,
arid small amounts of it enter into our fwd and affect us all.
Fortunately. it is only a my sman part of the total fury of a
bomb that affecEs us as a result of tests, but the number of
bombs tested is very small compared to the number that would
be used in a nuclear war. he &al of alrnost e hundred megatons of fission yield of all bombs which have hem tested by all
four nuclear nations probably amounts to less than 1 per cent of
wr stdpile. Thus, while we study the effects of -time
fdout, we must bear in mind that whatever harm might be
done by fallout is extremely small indeed compared to the havoc
of the nuclear war we must prwent

TESTING AND FALLOUT
Nuclear weapons cannot be dweloped to any great extent withwt testing Small improvements can presumably be made by the
present nuclear powers on dle basis of themetical calculations
alone, building on the experience of past tests. But making
big advances and establishing coddence in newly designed
weapons requires tests. Such advan- in the past have required
not single tests but whole series of tests. A non-nuclear nation
will require quite a series of tests to gain experience and become
a nuclear power, unless it is supplied w i d very detailed weapons
information or with the weapons themselves by one of the present nuclear powers.
Almost all nuclear test. have been carried out in the atmo.
spere. Six were carried out underground in Nevada in 1!3!3758.
These were quite small tests. Two have been carried out above
the atmosphere about three hundred mile above the South
Atlantic in 1958.
Tests in the atmosphere (and those immediately abwe the
trtmosphere) deposit great quantities of radioactive materials in
the air, in the form of fine dust. Eventually this falls to the
ground, mainly brought down by rain or snow. But it may reside
in the atmosphere a long time before it reaches the ground. This
is fortunate, because many of the radioactive materials are so
short-lived that they have lost most of their radioactivity before
they fall.
A one-megaton bomb produces as much energy as the explosion of a million tons of TNT, That's a lot of TNT. It would fill
a trench six feet wide and six feet deep ten miIes long. Now
think of a third as much radium, a third of a million tons of it.
Radium is a very radioactive substance. The radiation (counting
gamma rays only) from the products of a one-megaton bomb
one hour after it explodes is equivalent to that of all that radium
If the material from the bomb could be kept in one place, its
radioactivity would rapidly become weaker: after a day, it

would be d y one-meth as strong, b a WE&, we 0v&hm
dredth. A yew afrer the exphion, the radioactivity would be
equivalent to about six tons of radium, which is still a lot - far
more than the world's supply of radium.

I
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local fallout
I
But while its radioactivity is decaying, it is also being diluted
by spreading out into the atmosphere in various ways. It spreads
in merent ways for bombs of Werent sizes. Most A-Bomb
have enough power to push their mushroom clouds of hot radioactive gaws seven to ten miles high The part of the cloud that
gets up there may stay there for sorrnething Wre a month or mom.
That is time enough for it to be b h around the wmId in an
--west
h d - it doesn't spread far north or south. S o m e
whme h this band w i t h a couple af months most of it owndown in rain. But part of the radioactive material is too coarse
to get well mixed with the lofty winds and comes down much
sooner as "
1
d
fabut". This is particularly stccmg if the bomb I
is exploded near enough to the p u n d to suck up a lot of
aeutrw-irradiated eartb.
Local fallout spreads on the grwnd in what may be lethal:
intensities for maay miles downwind perhap hundreds of milw
if it i s a big bomb. In war, this wwld mean that many millions
of people not within the range of the blast and immediate radiation uf any of the bombs would neverthdm be Idled ar very
seriously injured. h most d the area the injury to a person
would come from several hours of exposure to the radiation coming from the s h c e of the ground about him.
Shielding by several feet of earth or ammete wodd provide
pmt&ion sgahst this, but being in an ordinary house above the
level of the gmmd wouldn't help. Being in the basement below
ground level d d provide prokction if one could stay there
for several weeks while the intensity of the radiation decays.
After that, if (aptimfstici) the war should stop with one attack, one of the most urgent problems would & how to provide

'I
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food from the oontarninatd soil. The fallout in war, in addition
to all the other damage, would be so enormously much worse
than fallwt from testing that our primary concern, as we discuss
the testing of nuclear weapons, must be to avoid war.
The local fallout from testing is deliberately c&ed
to relatively uninhabited areas. Even so, it has mused tmuble. The
unlucky crew of the Japanese fishing vessel *Lucky Dragon"
received a d o u s dose of radiation, fatal to one of them, about
one hundred miles away from a Bikini H-bomb test in 1954. A
group of Marshall Island natives, even thwgh evacuated
quickly, were sadly injured. At wr continental proving grounds
in a Nevada desert, wmpatativeIy smaU bombs have been
tested, a fraction of one per cent of tbe big H-bomb in power.
Serious trouble with Iocal fdmt has thus been avoided. But the
radiation levels for a few arid towns have been high enough to
cause some concern.

worldwide fallout
A big H-bomb produces such an immense body of hot air that
its mushroom cloud rises quickly up into the stratosphere, perhaps 25 miles above the earth. If the bomb is burst several miles
abave the earth, almost all of its radioactivity is carried up into
the stratosphere, where it mixa with worldwide air currents a d
stays for m y months. If the bomb bursts less than two or three
m i l e above the earth, as would be more usual in d a r e , the
intensely bright and radioactive %all of firem which farms at the
time of the burst would be large enough to reach the ground.
Earth would be vaporized and local fallout wwld be intense.
But in either case, much of the radioactivity is carried daft
for worldwide distribution. Up there, high above the weather,
the air cirdation is more regularly east-and-west than it is with
the prevailing winds near the ground. Howit also seems to
spiral gradually from near the quator towards the pies. The
gradual mixing of the air fswn the stratosphere into the lower
regions seems to take placer mostIy near the poles, where add
6

air descends. The d h c t i v e material may spend a month or
mure in the tmpwphere getting mixed up with the weather before it starts to came down in rain Most of it falls in the n d temperate zone, induding the laorthern half of the United States.
The nice tbing abwt this arrangement is that practically n w e
of this worldwide fallout m e s down very soon, and there is
time for the very m b e and shorl-lived part of the radioactivity
to die. The long-lived radioactive elemrents of the bomb debris
are the ones which cause concern. The most important of thae
are known as Strontium 90, and Cesium 137. It takes about
thirty years for these materials to lase half of their radioactivity.

present mnd fwure fallout
The increase of radioactivity fnmr fallout in the past few yaars
is shown by measurements d the Strmtium 90 in the soil near
New York City. The measurements are in a unit d e d miUicuries per square mile, and the increase is interesting. A t the end

I

of 1954, the level of radbctivity was 7 units, at the ead of 1958,
it was 25 units, and at the end af 1958, whm testing had just
stoppi by mutual consent of the US and the USSR, it was SO
mi@.
But the intensity of Strontium 90 radiation has kept right
on going up, because this material is st&
for years in the
upper atmosphere and fails out slowly.

how fallout injurer people
TheTe is a great d d of coafusion in pmple's minds about how
much harm may be h e by fallout from testing. The confusion
arises because the technical facts are meager and they are interpreted by people who take different attitudes towards u n d tics. Thase attitude vary all the way from -what WB don't lmow
won't hurt us" to
safe than sorry." Unfmbmably, &there's
a lot we don't know for sure. The best dentists can do in this
new and insdliciently explored Geld is t~ give probable d t s
and limits of uncerhinty.
More M c a l l y , n u b testing affects future human life in
two important ways. It has bearing on the likelihood of war,
and it produces fallout which is harmful to an uncertain degree.
If one judges that testing makes war less likely, he must amsida
whether a possible saving of life in this way mun&balances an
inevitable but laser harm to life though fallout. Some who hold
this view tend to minimize fallout damage and emphasize the
small end of the range of uncertainty. An opposing point of view
is that each big bomb tested ia the atmusphere condernns a number of people around the world to death - we M t lmow whom
nor how many - and holds that no nation has the right: to do tbis
to other people.
There are others who are convinced that continued testing
would make war more likely. For t h e
is no m&ct b
tween the two considmatiom. Both lead to the conclusion that
worldwide abstinence from testing is desirable if attainable.
With this perspective, let us examhe the nature of the harm
dane by fallout from b t s .
7
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fallout

Radiation from fdout hurts p q l e in two ways. It causes
diseases in people now living and shortens their life span. By
causing changas in the reproductive cells of people now living
it causes genetic damage to people of future genmah. By
way of sIight -ce,
it may at least be said that the total
amount of h t h kinds of bouble expectd as a r d of past
bomb tests is very mall cornpad to the total amount of sucb
trouble in the world. There are many thousands of cases of radiation-indud dismse in the world every year and the am&
of
misery involved is tremendous. Yet the population of the -Id
is so large that the number seems small on a percentage basis.
These Efects Of RmWion and F&t
have been discussed

in a pamphlet of that title by James F, Crow in somewhat mare
detail than is possible here.' There has been no change in fundamental knowledge since the publication of this pamphlet, only
in some detailed estimates which remain uncertain.

THE HORROR OF NUCLEAR WAR
It is very difEcult to gasp the horrible destruction
would
come with nuclear war. W e seem to have a mental bmir that
protects us from the unpleasantness of mntemp1ating human
grief on so vast a scale. W e should at I&
be aware that the
s d e of pain and dmth and desolation would be vast indeed,
and that it mn happen here. It would not be Wre the bombing
of England or Germany in the last war, when in two or three
years as much explosive energy was delivered as would be cartied today in a single medium-sized H-bomb.Those raids were
terrible enough, but they were small and innauxous compared
to what would happen taday. The d=truction was spotty and
there was time for succor and reorganization between raids.
Today whole cities would go out in a flash, the entire organization of our society would disappear over night. The instantly
----'Effects nf Rdbtfm and F a h u t . Public Affairs Pamphlet No.256,25#.
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dead within two miles of a bomb would be lucky compared
with those farther away whose skin might peel & from flesh
burns, or who might be incinerated in the fkshmn. Thm
would be little or no chance for care of the wounded, for they
would be legion and in mwt p h the hdthy people whb
were further from tfie bombs would have to hide in holes and
cellars to avoid the radiatim from "l.d
fallout,
g extending in
a wide swath hundreds of miles downwind horn each big bomb
bunt. When they would emerge weeks later, they wwld face
the pblezn of controlling the panic of desperate mobs fighting
for the ranaining f d supplies, and of raising food fit to eat
from contaminated soil.
That it wwld be terrible beyond imagination there is no
doubt, but it is impossible to say just how bad it wwld b,how
many would survive the direct effectsof the initial attack, how
mar& would d v e the ensuing panic and turmoil and disease,
how many might m
e an orderly and productive existence,
and to what extent some remnants of civilization might survive.
We haw no experience with human bebavim under such exof terror and universal bema-t.
Studies have been made of what might happen if we usmnw
an attack of a certain intensity, but it wodd be a mistake to cansidm the result a prediction of what wllI happen. There was in
treme-ric

1958 a hearing of a congressional committee investigating the
results of a single attack with a total of 1,469 megatons dhib
uted in a particular way ovm the United States. The results were
discussed as though &is is what we could expect: £ram a nuclear
war: thirty million people killed outright and many more seriwsly injured. The catch is that this is probably a small fraction
of the preseht Swiet stockpile, and an attack either now or
within a very few years a d d be many times that intense.

need far a ehonged attitude
TXSis not ody what could h a p p here In our belwed country,
to end all that we know and cherish. If we look at the repeated
wars of history, if we examine how little we have done to change
the competitive ways of nations, we may reasonably judge that
this is what probably will happen here. Yet it's unthinkable that

it should. Throughout history there always have been wars.
Suddenly, in the middle of the twentieth century, the very meaning of the word "war* has completely changed. There must be
no more war, not even one. If this is to be so, we must examine
how the ways of mankind can be changed to accompfish it.
Though eveything is in a state of 0ux, the change ia our polltical thinking tends to be gradual, It seems doubthl whether the
ways of mankind can be changed quickly enough to keep pace
with the rapidity of technological change, An idea for a small
change capable of reducing the likelihood of war may be more
valuable now than an idea for a big change which would eventually make war impossible but leave a serious risk of war in
the immediate future.

reducing the liirslihood of war
Compared with h e r sorb d disarmament or arms control, a
worldwide cessation of ksts an the basis of a reasonable control
agreement is a step which q u i r e only a small change in international political thinking. It would not make war impossible.
It would not make it appreciably less homiIe if it shouId occur.

ut it should considerably reduce the danger that war d break
,,outby accident or design. This is the p t benefit which would

"bexpected to follow from a good test ban agreement no matter
whether or not furthm steps of arms control would follow. An
added benefit is that such an agreement wwld set the stage for
h t h e r agreement, not only by giving the world expaience with
enforcing an agreement, but also by keeping the techniques of
nuclear warfare from developing to such a &ed
stage that it
might become impossible to bring them under effective control.

TESTING AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

I

To attain its present advanced state of nuclear technology the
United States has carried out about a hundred and thirty nuclear
tests, and the Soviet Union has d e d out about sixty. Y w may
ask why these nations would want to carry out more tests when
they have mdde so many? One answer is that it is the nature of military competition always to require more and better
weapons. W e have now wrne to the point where one bomber
ca+ing one single bomb ( a twenty megaton H-bomb) can de
liver more explosive power than was used by all nations throughout all of World War II. The present rniIitary desire is not for a
stilI bigger explosive but for ability to deliver it with a more
convenient vehicle than a big bomber. There is a similar daire
far more compactnes and greater ease of delivery on down the
line of less powerful weapons.
The nuclear arms race has three separate phases: (1) The
nuclear natiohs are developing their arms to attain a greater degree of refinement, This tends to make a surprise attack more
devastating and swift. ( 2 ) The non-nuclear nations are working
toward the development of their own nuclear arms. (3) The
nuclear nations are increasing the stockpiles of the weapons they
already know how to make.
A good test ban agreement would put a lid on the first two
darts,. but not on the third. In this sense, a controlled test ban

would begm to "taper off the arms race, but would not and it.
It wwfd pmvent its spreading and growing with ever p t e r
Anemeat. It: would at least raise prospect of something better
than the infinite upward spiral until the ultimate explosion.
There hue a number of causes of international tensions. But
anxiety wer the future of the arms race is perhaps the most
dangerous. No one h o w s when some national leader, stirred
up over some real or fancied issue and unable to foxesee anything but ultimate disaster. may in desperation decide to provoke a showdown when he can have the advantage of surprise
attack. If, In the -saw of competing developments, he should
fee1 he had a temporary advantage in weapons' techniques, he
might feel partioularly tempted to strike, It is in this sense that
a successful test ban could bring a valuable reduction of tensions. It would p t l y slow down the development of evm mom
insidious weapons. It would level off the upwwd
od the
m s development race. And it d
d m o v e the basis for t h ~
w e r a t e decision that one might as well get the war ovm with,

wal

came what may.
A mt ban agreement need not I
d to any relaxation of national
to maintain a s u c ~ ~ ~dehmnt,
ful
and there is no
logical reasan why it shwld. For that reason it does not require
any great change ia our political thinking. There is nothing unilateral about it (aside from the possibility of one side cheating
in the realm of very small tests). It hampers new d i h y dwelopments of both sides alike. It Ieaves each side free and, within
the -tar of mutual detemnts, obligated to maintain a military
force adequate to make it m e t a b l e for the other to attadr.
Two points must thm be quite dear. First, an agreement to
Ism tests d m notrneazlgn end to the a r m race. whatwarneed
there may be for building more weapons or perfecting the nonnuclear components of weapons is not altered. $emnd, we cannot expect great economies from a test ban apmmnt done.
Any saving there might be in not carrying out some aqwcb of
testing and associated dmfupmeat may be mare than &et by

-

Smlutlon
A g#rd test
ban agreemenf backed
by inspeeion.

SolutionA good te*
ban agreement backed
by inspectian.

4
,

,.

wlmr wmaponr

or* bdng
eonstantly
increased-

Solution-Control
of production of

nuclear materials
and methods
of delivery.
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e x p d i h w e s on tbe test-ban c o n i d sy-.
The purpose of a
teit ban is economy of risk, not economy of d o h . Suhbmtid
reduction of militay budgets would 'be expected only aftafter
further st- of arms oonhl.

the mony-nuclear-nation problem
As long as tbe ccanpetidon remains between the tight Angle
American partnership on the one side and the Soviet Union on
the other, many people have come to believe that there is a g w d
chance for mutual d-ts
to keep the peace between them for
quite a few years, perhaps several dead=. It is reasonable to
hope that each side will act rationally and that neither can rationally decide to attack the other. If there were half a dozen
or a dmen independent centers where the decision could be
made to launch a surprise nuclear attack, sncb ;a hope would not
be reasonabIe. Yet the capability to make nudear weapons will
inevitably spread to many countries if nothing is done to prevent
it. We axe marching almost inexorably into a world in which the
danger of an accidental outof war wilI be even huch
greater than it is today. wth the spread of nudear weapons
capabilities, we cannot expect a war to remain confined between
two blligerents, A war triggered by small nuclear nations is apt
to engulf large ones. An attacked oountry may even have to
guess by whom it was attacked.
The negotiations between tbe three nuclear powers which
have been progressing at Geneva since 1958 have been working
toward an initial agreement between thae three powers. They
have discussed a network of 170 control stations throughout the
world, of which 21 would be in the U.S.S.R., I9 in the U.S., and
4 in Great Britain. The immediate difEculty has been one of
working out a satisfactory compromise between the wetern desire to have adequate control and the Soviet reluctanc~to admit
inspmtors. Once this dif6culty is overcome and an agreement
can be signed between these three powers, woxk at installing
the inspection stations in their temitori~can commence. It will

I

then be necessary to extend the agreement to inelude the &
important countries of the worId.
Many of them will be easy to persuade, particularly those
which have not yet made substantial investments in a nuclear
arms program, if we may judge by the attitudes shown in United
Nations debateg of nuclear testing. The attitude of France shows
&at persuasion may be Wcult after a nation is thoroughly committed to a development program. She has used her p t i g e as
a nascent nuclear nation to try to persuade the great nuclear
powers to go further with disarmament rather then simply
banning tests, but resisted a b t ban.
A non-nuclear nation might feel it unfair that it is a s k d to
renounce something that 0th- have and intend to retain. Here,
one must be a realist and recog&e the unpleasant nuclear facts
of life. In a sense the p t nuclear powers are stuck with what
they have, and dare not let go. Each r&es
that its nuclear
might is a mixed blessing, that it gives it unprecedented power,
but no real security. It is a deterrent against attack and an invitation to attack, but h e invitation might be greater if it would
let down its guard. The non-nuck powers should rejoice if the
great nuclear powers can go so far as to agree on an &ective
k t ban. Since such an agreement could not be effective for long
without the adherence of the non-nucIear powers, each of them
should be willing to adhere to the agreement.

withhoiding nuclaor weapons information
In building up alliances to boIster the positions of the two great
power centers, the great nuclear powexs axe tempted to
stragthen the ground armies of their m-nuclear allies by

giving them nuclear weapons. Xf m e side does tbis, the ottrer
feels forced to, and thae is no great net gain on either side. Yet,
there can be a serious net l a s kmme of the difhuion of nu&
weapons information to other countries.
United States policy, as established in 19!jB, is to provide the
armies of our NATO dim with nuclear weapons, but with a

string attached. The nuclear warheads themselves remain in U.S.
possession, under the control of an American &cer on the spot,
until the emergency arises in which they are to be used. Althaugh
it is hard to know wbeiher security arrangements are effective,
this has the purpose of preventing the transfer d d d e d
weapons information ta the other counhy. Such information
would make it sigdcantly easier for that country to design
nuc1mr weapons of its own, and might even make it possible for
it to become a nudear nation on xt modest scale without carrying
out any m.It is evident, then, that our present poKq should
be administered with the utmost caution, and should be retracted rather &an extended in scope, if we are to retain free
dom of action in seeking worldwide arms development control.
Another aspect of the problem is the need to avoid the passession d dangeaous fissionable materials by dm non-nuclear
nations. Such materials are made in bulk but are not refined to
the required quality in the nuclear reactors being instalfed ta
produce industria1 power in various cowbries. Such reactors are
built md operated on the basis of bilateral agreements h e e n
a nuclear and a non-nucIear country. The fuel is ultimately n
turned to the nuclear country for r e g , and this provides a
controt on the availability of such material for nuclear weapons.
This function might well be carried out by the International
Atomic Energy Agency under the auspices of the U.N.

stopping tests to ovoid fallout
As we have seen, another incentive for stopping ksb, but a less
urgent me, is the desire to avoid the radioactive contamhation
of the atmosphere. WhiIe almost all tests in the past have been
d e d out above ground, it seems likely that in the future many
of them will be d e d out underground if thwe should be no
test-ban ageemeat The f a h t incentive applies only to the
atmospheric ~ t s But
.
the desixe to control arms development
in order to make war less likely provides a strong incentive for
u test-ban agreement applying to all kinds of tests.

C

I

TECHNlQUES OF TEST CONTROL

The Crst Soviet atomic b m b ttxt somewhere in Siberia in 1949
was detected by means of airplanes flying over northwatcm
United States. Filters itre used to collect radioactive s a m p l ~
from the air for laboratmy analysis. By this methad it is even
possible to tell what the h b was made of and a good dm1
about its effectiveness. Thus it would not be hard to set up an
effective control systm to monitor a worldwide ban on tests in
the atmosphere. Part of it is operating under national auspices
h dy.

underground tests
It was discovered by means of a test in Nevada in 1957 that the
energy and the radioactivity of an atomic bomb can be contained by the weight of the earth if it is detonated deep underground, In this test, the bomb was placed at the end of a tunnel
far into the side of a mesa, placing it under about 800 feet of
rock. The tunnel was curved near the bomb, in such a way that
the shock wave from the explosion collapsed and sealed o£F the
tumeI before any gasses mid escape. Rock was suddenly
vaporized and the surrounding rock compressed to form a
spherical cavity. Most of the radioactivity was sealed in a glassy
inner lining formed from melted rock. T h e roof of the cavity
soon caved in and the radioactive glass was concentrated in a
heap at the bottom, covered by a pile of loose rock. The cave-in
left a partidy empty space far above the original sphere, but
not extending to the surface. Although the largest bomb tested
underground was a 18-kilotons, about the size of the Hiroshima
bomb, larger explosions might be contained at greater depths.
In establishing a conbol system to monitor a nuclear test ban,
the main probIem is to provide assurance that no underground
tests axe being carried out in secret. They can be detected by
observing vibrations, known as seismic waves, which they send
out through the earth. The trouble is that earthquakes send out
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rather sirnilax sign&. These have bsea observed on recordiag
seismographs for a long time, but seismologists have not had
mu& experience in trying to distinguish between earthquakes
and underground blasts. One method w e already h o w about is
based on the fact that the blast m h sudden outward pressure
in dl dirpections, whereas an earthquake d m n d Thus seismographs in four directions £mm a blast under appropriate conditions would each give a signaI with an upward first motion, as
compared to two upward and two downward around a normal
earthquake. A few earthquakes are abnormal in this respect and
might be suspected of being blasts. For this reason an ideal control system based on present technorogY would indude both a
network of seismographic detection stations and an arrangement
whereby suspicious signals w d d be followed up by a careful
inspection of ail clues on the spot where the signals originated.
Between the summer of 1858 and tbe summer of 1980 there
have been a long series of meetings at Geneva to discuss the details of an a w m e n t to set up such a control system. Important
progress has been made in remnciling differences b e e n the
Soviets and ourselves, but substantial aerences remain. It appears as though a new awareness of the importance of agreement
will have to be born on both sides before the find points can be
settled. The most important question still to be worked out is the
number of on-site inspections to be authorized. The Swiet Union
would like to limit the number of its territory to thrm a year.
The United States is ins-g
on more.
The necessity of having a control system capable of detecting
serious violations of a nuclear test ban arise h the distrust
of one nation by another when they are in the throes of a highly
competitive a r m s race. Each wants assurance that the other is
not obtaining same crucial militay advantage by carrying out
weapons development involving seaet tests. A control system
is to be judged, therefore, not only by its ability to detect tests
that we know how to make, but also to direct them if specid
ways are devised to hide them. But even if we are suspicious to

a

believing that another nation might go to some
trouble to hide tests, we must be reasonable in judging how
much &they might decide to expend.
the extent of

muffling tests in big holes
The method of hiding ~ t sosfar discussed which ixmns the
least imphusibb involves preparing a wry large round mvity
deep underground and detonating the bomb at its cater. The
air space around the bomb muffla the shock transmitted to the
surrounding rock. Two very difEerent kinds of vibrations go out
into the r&, along with various intermediate varieties. The
first is a sharp "ping made when the shock wave in the air
meets the rock It remains quite strong for two or three hundred
miles, but becomes rapidly weaker at p t e r distance?. The
second is a dull -thudn, a slow outward &ft of the rock to make
room for the expansion of the cavity when the air in it is made
extremely hot by the energy of the bomb. This dull signal dies
When w e make a groph to show how the
pressure in the rack (near the big hole)
changes very quickly wrth time, the initial
"p~nq"looks like a high spike, twenty times
as high as the longer-lasting rise of pressure
It is #hi>general rise of pressure which
carrier to the greotelt disinnce.
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off more gradually at greater &tan-,

and in most casa- it can
be observed thousands of miles away. Because it havels so far,
it has been considered to be the most useful basis for monitoring,
and the control system wbich has been discussed at Geneva depends entirely on this low-frequency s i p d . S e i s m o m have

been accustomed to observing distant earthquakes with such
low-frequmcy signals. It see~nsquite cwtain that future mearch
work will find new ways of distinguishg between earthqualres
and blasts, making use of other parts of the signal. The *ping
from a test in a cavity is probably unlike anythmg horn an
&quake.
We come next to the questions "How big a cavity is needed
and how deep underground?" and "Might it be practical ox
worthwhile to prepare so big a holeT Up to a certain size, the
bigger the hole is made, the better it mufaes an explosion, but
beyond that size it doesn't help to make it bigger. To do a g d
job, it has to be ezlormous, and a good job is pretty good. It is
good enough to make the bomb s e e m le0 times smaller than it is.
That is, the bomb in tbe big avity can be 1%) thna as powerful
as the one that gives the same 'dull thud" when it is exploded in
the rock with no cavity around it. The strength of the thud abo
depends on the kind of rock If the cavity is made in a hard rock
like rock salt and the thud compared with a bomb wi& no cavity
in Nevada-type rock where bombs already have ktested, the
m d e d shot w d d seem three hundred Limes less pow&
than
it is.

But this take a very big hole. I t requires a volume of 110
cubic yards for each ton of TNT equivalent, if the mvity is half
a mile underground. For a twenty-kiloton test, the size of the
Hiroshima bomb, this would meaa a hole 500 feet in diameter
at that depth. An empty hole of that size and shape has apparit probably a d d be made without
caving in if it is made in rock salt In fact, a few cavities just
a b u t this big have been made in rock salt and left full of liquid
which helps to hold up the r d . They are made by pumping
water through for some years to dissolve out the salt and then
used for storing petroleum prducts. But &txe were not made
in defiance of a control system. If the brine were dumped in a
river it would be fairly easily detected, and it wwid be very
difficultto carry out such a construction job in secret.
ently never been made, but
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Any deep man-made cavities in other kinds of r d are very
much smaller than that. It is doubtful that they could be made
much larger. Natural caves are not the right shape and not deep
enough undaxground to be much good Carlsbad C a m , if
a d b l e from- the National Park service, wwld be good for
about ten kilotons and cavexps as big as that are extremely rare.
There is only one other in North America, for example, and the

n~helowheinbkdyaboutatda~Mg.
If a hole were used of &s
volume &am we have been
talking about, the m d h g would be pmeortionrtely la e f b
tive. If for a twenty kiloton bomb, for example, we were to we
a hob of half the diameter, 250 feet across i n d of 500, the
voIume would be eight times s d e r md the bomb would s e e m
only 15 times Iess powerful than it is, not 120 times. That's s t i l l
a big hole. A control system would perhaps have to Ix more a h t
for such *partial m a g than for the most &ective mufltling
because it would be IESS difEdt to construct a m& hoh

how good is o comml ~ h * ~ v k ?
The problem of detecting the cmslxuction of big holes or d e
tecting the m d e d signals h bIasts irr big holm is considerably simplified by the fact that salt f d m s occur in only
very limited geographical regions. Su& regions occupy l e s than
1 per cent of the area of the Soviet Union, for exampk, and they
do not ovmlap the regions where earthquh are frequmt. This
is v a y important for it means that at an-site irlspection can be
made ev"y time there is a seismic signid £ram a region where
The
there is salt, even if only a few bpchons are
seismic network needs to be apable only of hmting sign&
frorn a blast mufaed by sucb a hole, not capable of
it £mn an &quake.
For this, quite weak s i p a h d i n g
the apparatus s h d d d c a .
The network including seismic stations in the Soviet Union, for
example, was first seriously considered as a part of a mtm1
system for u n m d e d wtr. It d d be able to detect and b t e
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very small tests, down to one Hoton, but not to distinpish all
these horn earthquakes.
It is consided desirable U this be suppleme~tedby a
reasonable number of on-site iqections, so that the control
organization can SBrnpIe the suspicious si@
by arbitrary
choice, ta determine whether they were d q u a k e ~ and
, thus
make it very likely that a violator would be caught if he should
make several ~Iandestinet&s of even fairly small bombs. The
risk of being caught and e x p d More world opinion should
be a strong detmexlt to a potent511violator.
There are many weak earthquake tremors which might be
confused with a small underground test, fewer strong en+
ta be confused with a larger test. In an average year there are
probabIy about 100 per year in the Soviet Union strong enough
to be mnfused with a 20-Won test. With the pattan for distii%utingthe 21 stations as discussed at Geneva, the controI network wouId be capable of identifying some of these earthqllakm.
but leave something like 60 per year unidentified and t h d w e
suspicious. Twenty hpections per year, giving a sampliug of
about one out of three, would probably be ample to discourage
violations. Practically aU of these earthquakes are in the %eismic
regions" which constitute d y about onetenth of the area of
the oountry. If one occurs outside this region, there would be no
question of sampling; it would be i n s p e d .
Some r e p & a b u t Congressiond hearings have exaggerated
the difficulties of monitoring a t~ ban. IE an evader should go
to a great deal of trouble and is a?& to hide the preparation of
big hoIes that might b practial to construct, the %station
network discussed at Geneva would pennit some rather considerable evasions up to perhaps % of 1 per cent of the size
of a big H-bomb, but a rather rnodest extension of the 21-station
network would make it quite efFective and bring this figure down
to w d under 1/10 af 1per cent.
The reason for emphasis on the 21-station network in the
U.S.S.R. is historical. It has been favorably discussed and even
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upon in the Geneva discussions, and here is
a tendency for negotiators to b tmaciws on such poiub. Im-

tentatively a@

portant technical irnpruvements in monitoring effectiveness are
to be expected in the future without i n m a g the n u m b d
stations, and much p t a improvements will be possible if the
number of stations mn be inaeased
There is an important tie-in betweal n u m b of stations and
area covered by on-site inspection. This might make it seexn
reasonable to the Soviets as well as to us to establish conaidesably greater numbers of stations, mostly robot stations. If the
stations were dmer, as they would be with about 100 stations in
the U.S.S.R. concentrated particularly m the seismic and salt m
gions, it would be possible to locate the sowre of eadquake
signals much more accurately. The technique of making a mparkon signal by going out and exp1dg a ehemid m e
near the site of the suspicious event can be used more effsctivdy
with the stations closer together and is expected to be very useful both for Ioating the event accurately and fm determhhg
whether it is an earthquake.
Much of the seismic region is wild mountain country where a
rather simple on-site inspection wodd show there had been no
human activity. In other cases a &ed
search would be rtt
quired. One promising method is sirnilax to that used by oil
pmpectors to locate special layers in the rock. S d blasts are
set d€in a small hole in the &round, and seismcrgraphs set up
nearby record the reflections of the waves it sends out As w e
have s e m , an undmptmd nuclear blast in the soM rocat leave
a large cavity filled with loose rock, and this cavity would be
readily found by this method.

developing arms-control techniques
Considering the importance of the subject, it seems unfortunate
that so little research and development has been done on the
technical problems that arise in controlling a test ban. Tfie
State Department has a small group dealing witb the problem

of negotiation. It solicits techuid help from otfier agmcies and
the Defense lhprhnent lets out contracts for rather modest
investigations. Back in the early l W s , when it was thought
possible to develop an atomic bomb, though it looked extremely
Wcult, a cooperative project was set up with large laboratories
where specialists with various backgrounds could exchange ideas
while working toward a oornrnon goal. The same was true of
radar and other important dwehpments. It Is to he hoped that
we will soon have such an imaginative and ampaative project
in the broad field of arms control, covering an its poIitica1 and
psychological aspects as well as its technical aspects, with tbe
gad of devising the bsst possible. agreements from the point of
view of reducing the likelihood of war and king acceptable to
all nations. The contracts already started on #c
problems of
nuclear test control, and international cullaboration on this subject which m y soon be undertaken, would be usefully supplemented by such a general project to explore the future needs of
more far-raching steps of anns control.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
A woridwide cessation of nuclear tests is a step of arms deve1op
mt control. It doesn't control arms themselves, but it puts a lid
on their future development. It could be a usefd step wen if it
remains a Long time the d y step in this direction It not only
tends to preserve the techniml possibility of arms mnlrol but it
provides experience and confidence to enencourage taking further
steps,

eontmlting production of n u c k r materials
Stopping N u c t i o n of the special materials needed for the construction of nuclear weapons wodd be another step which mi@
s m be practiml. The degree of inspection is modest enough
that it might be tolerated under present conditions by the Swiet
Union. In fact, if the Soviets would agree, it wodd be sensible
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to take tbis action at the same time as &e test ban. S w i n g
tests requires a detection network which is rather dabmate technically. But it does not interfere seriously with militq
because on-site inspections wwld have to cover ody relatively
s m d areas, mainly in wild regions. Stopping production rega different sort of inspection-sending inspectors to factories to
h d out what is being made. The great nuclear powers have
already produced so much mat& that tbey would not feel it
a great militmy hardship to desist from further production, and
the non-nucIear nations might £4
better about joining an agree
ment which includes control of nuchar production by the big
powers. Control of production in the non-nuclear nations would
provide an additional check on the spread of nuclear weapons.

diff icutty of aliminoqing stmtkpiles
After stopping production, what next? Swze glib props& have
been made which include getting rid of all nuclear materials, or
of large parts of the stockpiles. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to venfy by technical meELns whether a nation has gotten rid of
all its fissionable material. It has been aptly said that the best
instrument fox such detection is a screwdriver to open every
packing case!
From examination of the histo'y and the present condition of
all production faciIities, it wwId be possibIe to make a rough
estimate of the amount of material that has been produced. But
if the estimated amount were delivexed and datroyed z w d i n g
to an agreement, other countries would remain uncertain how
much might be left over. This would be a way to reduce quite
drastically the amount of material available, but some form of
assurance against hidden stockpiles would probably be required,
such as an overwhelming U.N.military mpabfity. It might alsa
be possibIe to wtablish control of stockpiles by questioning the
people who should h a w about them. But the control of the
stockpiles already produced is so di&cult that it is not promitsing
as an anarlv step in arms control.

control of delivery vehicles
Control or elimination of the v e h i c l ~of delivery of nuclear
weapons is a much more promising possibility. If we could b
come sddently alarmed by the continued arms race to become
seriously interested in actual disarmament, we should try to
make agreements for the controllad elimination of long-range
missiles, hmbing airplanes, rmket-launching submarines, etc.
Submarines can be controlled through inspection of their bases,
and bombing planes are easy to find. Missiles present the chief
problem. If we could reach an agreement fairly soon to eliminate
them, it should be possible by careful inspection to make sure
that none are missed. But if several years pass during which
solid-fuel missiles can be installed in inconspicuous holes in the
ground, it will become much more M c u l t to enforce a ban.
no need for s e c ~
If we could eliminate ail vehicles for the delivery d nudear
weapons, we would at the same time practically eliminate the
need for military secrecy. If there could be complete disarmament, even Khmshchev has pointed out that there would be no
further need for secrecy. Bur inspection is needed to verify compliance in most minor steps of disarmament, no matt= how
small. And the Soviet Union bas a specid reason to resist roving
inspectors because it has presumably been succassful in hiding
the exact location of its missile bases. Elimination of practically
aU delivery vehicles, particularly all missiles, would be about the
least that could be done to get past this difficulty.
Such a substantial step of disarmament would be valuable not
only in getting rid of the missiles that are poised b exterminate
wr cities, but would provide improved atmosphere for settling
o t h a world problems. Yet caution would s e e m to demand some
instrument of force, e i h r a world police force or residual national armament, to take the plaoe of the nuclear detmrmce
being given up. Before 1945, war was accepted as a reasonable

extension of diplomacy as an instrument of national policy.
There wme circumstances in which war might pay, With the
nuclear threat, this is no longer true. In a nuclear war, b t h
sides wodd lose. (There are still those who argue that we must
have a plausible threat of nuclear war as an instrument of national policy, but not war itself. )
If we get rid of vehicles for nuclear delivery, or take further
steps to tame the sudden nuclear threat, there will be problems
of arranging some kind of balance to discourage aggression.
With nuclear bombs still in existence, perhaps only in hidden
stockpiles, the possibility of delivery by commercial aircraft
would constitute a mild threat. Inspection at airpods could
guard against this, and ground-to-air missiles and other purely
defensive systems might be retained which could be very &ective against such an improvised attack. The prospects of attacking would not be likely to tempt a serious military plunner.
U.N.troops at key troubb spots would probably also be used
as an important new element of world stability.

war &ill must be avoided
But even with strict axms controls, the need for avoiding war
would be as p t as ever. For any big war would soon grow
into a nuclear war. Tbe risk of a devastating surprise attack
would be eliminated, but dwing initial stages of a conventional
war there will be a race for the development of effective
bombers and missiles. Even if the nuclear warheads and mate
rials couId be eliminated, there would be a rllce to make these,
for the know-how cannot be erased. There would still be same
deterrent to a major attack. And if war should occur out of a sudden flame of temper over some incident, there would be time for
second thaughts before it m l d reach the proportion of a nuclear
holocaust.
The great gains in getting rid of delivery vehidw would be
the elimination of the danger of a n accidental attack which
could touch off sudden devastation and the elimination of the
27

temptation to seek the advantage of an overwhelming surprise
attack LE we could fully appreciate the uncertainties of the situation, we would probably insist that wr govemsolt pursue
more seriously the possibility of such a step of disarmament.
W e would surely m s e to tolerate our decade-long faihue to
establish a vigorous agency with adequate laboratory and development facilities dedicated solely to devising and m i n g
psibIe paths to a more stable peace through variws degrees
of arms contro1.
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